This article applies social network analysis techniques to a case study of police corruption in order to produce findings which will assist in corruption prevention and investigation. Police corruption is commonly studied but rarely are sophisticated tools of analyse engaged to add rigour to the field of study. This article analyses the 'First Joke' a systemic and long lasting corruption network in the Queensland Police Force, a state police agency in Australia. It uses the data obtained from a commission of inquiry which exposed the network and develops hypotheses as to the nature of the networks structure based on existing literature into dark networks and criminal networks. These hypotheses are tested by entering the data into UCINET and analysing the outcomes through social network analysis measures of average path distance, centrality and density. The conclusions reached show that the network has characteristics not predicted by the literature.
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Background
Public officials who place their own interests before those of the public have corrupted a system in which they are supposed to act as agents of the public will (Lauchs 2007) .
Police are an essential part of the Australian justice system and are the frontline actors in keeping the peace and social stability and cohesion. Thus good governance relies on honest policing. However, there will always be at least a small group of corrupt police officers, even though Australians are culturally averse to corruption (Khatri et al. 2006) . Police officer's attract corruption because of their ability to enforce or ignore the law and police who are unethical or in financial stress are vulnerable to offers of illicit payments.
Organised police corruption, which is a subset of organised crime, aggravates the situation because it threatens the community by undermining good governance.
Organised police corruption constitutes "social behaviour, conducted in groups within organisations, that is powerful enough to override the officer's oath of office, personal conscience, departmental regulations and criminal laws." (Punch 2000) Organised corrupt policing is more dangerous than individual actions because collaboration between offenders can multiply their income; the income of the group is greater than the sum of the income of individuals acting apart (Morselli and Tremblay 2004) . There are many historical examples of powerful organised crime syndicates of predatory police establishing themselves within the Australian police services.
Policing bodies need to understand the nature and structure of these networks to be able to better identify and apprehend the targets of their investigations. As Warr has stated in relation to the policing of delinquents: "…it is difficult to imagine how investigators can develop, defend, or test general theories of delinquency without some knowledge of the organization and operation of delinquent groups" (Warr 1996) .
The necessity of studying criminal networks is well established but has not received much attention from social network theoretical approach (Morselli and Tremblay 2004; Moran 2005, 62) . The main contribution of this article is that in uncovering hidden (or confirming) bribe and other corrupt exchanges and their associated influence tentacles it provides a better understanding of the nature, structure and socialisation processes of these embedded networks. Understanding how corrupt police networks are structured and their dynamics affords better opportunities for strategies to be developed to interrupt dark networks and re-enforce positive policing practices. This study is a departure from current studies of criminal networks in that it draws on social network analysis to provide rigorous data to verify the characteristics of networks and particularly to uncover the hidden relationships that support them. This project will provide previously unavailable information on corrupt police networks in Australia. It is the first to study each of the separate inquiries into Australian police corruption and convert information from the inquiries into useful data for corruption prevention, detection or investigation; turn the unanalysed information and into actionable intelligence (Dean and Gottschalk 2007) . The project will provide insights into the structure and dynamics of their operation by unpacking the topology of their interconnections and increase understanding of points of intervention and strategies to sure up or insulate 'good networks' and stop them tipping over the edge and to the 'dark side'.
Although focused on the Queensland context, this article is part of a larger study that will interrogate corrupt police network across Australian jurisdictions. The article outlines and focuses on the first stage of the project being the corrupt police network in Queensland (Australia) called 'the Joke' that ran from the 1950s to the 1980s.
Corrupt Networks
Social networks form when people interact. Networks are a type of social organisation that rely on relationships of trust, mutuality and reciprocity, coupled with a set of common norms established and maintained through peer pressure, social approval and sanction (stigma), to bind individuals to a collective unit. The characteristic ability of networks to be inclusive, flexible in their operation and quick to respond to opportunities and problems networks can be leveraged to benefit individuals, groups or businesses or society at large (Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti, 1997) .
However, as Raab and Milward (2003) have noted networks can also have a dark side, where the network achievements come at the cost of other individuals, groups or societies. It has been argued that the particularism of networks, that is, the banding together to pursue particular or common interests, is a key element of network disadvantage since it can lead to exclusivity rather than an inclusive approach (Taylor and Hoggett 1994) . Such inclusivity renders networks as essentially private rather than public entities and therefore not exposed to wider levels of scrutiny or subject to external accountability regimes. Because of this, networks can be quite secret and invisible in their operation and endeavours.
This opaque nature of networks and their lack of transparency, coupled with values and norms that support clandestine actions and goals, can provide a basis for corruption. Granovetter (1992, p.45) points out" networks can create their own norms at odds with the outside world to the point where they become a 'law unto themselves". In such a context, illegal activities can take on the aura of normality and members protect each other from the sanctions of the outside world.
Current Research on Criminal Networks
Most of the study on criminal networks has been based on the structure of organised crime syndicates. The primary contemporary document on this subject is the United National Office of Drugs and Crime (2002) report entitled Results of a pilot survey of forty selected organized criminal groups in sixteen countries. This report examined forty organised crime groups and determined five typologies of organisational structure that range from a standard hierarchy which matches the longstanding Bureaucratic Model (Cressey 1969 ), through to criminal networks which are loosely connected individuals who regularly participate in crime. However, there has been a growing movement away from looking at the structure to examining the network itself. Albini (1971) and Ianni (1972) discussed how the Mafia was based on patronclient networks and or kinship relationships in which individuals were motivated by self interest. Other research has supported the loose network picture of organised crime (Kleemans and de Poot 2008; Bruinsma and Bernasco 2004; Block 1994; McIllwain 1999 ) culminating in Morselli's (2009, 55) claim that the study of hierarchical structures is no longer necessary. What is important for this work is not the structure of the syndicate but what we can learn from the network itself. That said, , there are some aspects of criminal networks that will help us predict the nature of a corrupt police network.
Social Network Analysis
Network analysis is an empirical tool which can be used to identify, measure, visualise (map) and analyse the ties between people, groups and organisations (Scott 1991, p.113) 
Police Culture and Networks
Corrupt police networks may share characteristics with other types of dark networks. It is well established in criminology that drug trafficking operations rely on kinship and friendship networks to protect themselves from penetration by law enforcement agencies; they only deal with people they know and trust (Edwards and Levi 2008, 368; Williams and Godson 2002, 328; Pearson and Hobbs 2001, viii; Morselli 2001, 205) . Cohesive networks like family relationships are ideal for criminal ventures where a strong degree of mutual trust is needed, especially carrying out activities with high criminal and financial risks (Bruinsma and Bernasco 2004, 90) . These relationships can also be developed over time through empirical evidence that a non-family member is trustworthy. This is more likely to be seen in long standing "high end" organisations (CMC 2004, 4) . It could be argued that a police agency is also a trust based organisation.
Members build trust by working together in dangerous and even life-threatening circumstances that weed out the untrustworthy. Groups may even develop their own criteria for trust for example; the New South Wales CIB mantra was "you never trust a man that doesn't drink" (Padraic 2005, 19) .
Hypothesis 1: the network will only extend to those who can be trusted through association with a common denominator.
Networks are made up of people performing specific roles. A key role is that of the broker who fills the spaces between nodes. Brokers are power players as they control communication between the parties that make up the network. In a corruption network it is assumed that the brokers will bring together the illicit operators outside the force with the police within the force who can provide them with protection. The illicit operators wanted support from the Joke, and that support worked because it was a syndicated operation rather than ad hoc arrangements between individuals. It is therefore likely that within the network are one or a few key persons who facilitate the communication between the payers and the police protectors.
Hypothesis 2: A small number of individuals will broker arrangements between the illicit operators and the police. has hypothesised that different cultures will display different network structures. If this is true then a corrupt network of police should be different to a criminal enterprise like a drug smuggling group. Also the difference should reflect the nature of the organisation. Smuggling operations have been plotted in the past (Chin and Zhang 2008) . These groups tend to be either highly structured in hierarchies or loosely structured flat networks (Natarajan and Belanger 1998, 1006) . The trend is to conclude that drug trafficking as fluid, loosely organised, adaptable social networks (Natarajan 2006, 172; Mackenzie 2002, 3, Chin and Zhang 2008, 186) . Rather than being a monolithic enterprise, drug smuggling is operated by smaller groups that interact in a flexible manner with different groups specialising in certain stages of the operation from growing the drugs, through supply to sale (Abele 2004 , 34, Williams 1998 , 155, Bruinsma and Bernasco 2004 .
A police network will probably be different because it is a network within a network, that is, within the Queensland Police Force. It is highly likely that the structure of the QPF will influence the structure of the network as the protection supplied by the police officers is determined by their power and jurisdiction within this agency. Thus we should not see officers from unrelated sections of the force, such as homicide detectives, within the corruption network. It should be centred on the Licensing Branch which has jurisdiction over the offences committed by the illicit operators. In addition, the hierarchical rank of the officers should play some part in the network as their authority to exercise discretion over raids, charges and even internal investigations should make them attractive to the network. Thus just as a criminal network selects it membership by the skill sets that are required (UN 2002) the police network will, out of necessity, have to select membership from those who can protect the network. Similarly, the structure of the network will then, of necessity, have a pyramidal hierarchy reflecting that of the agency.
Hypothesis 3: the structure of the corruption network will mirror the hierarchy of the police force thus it will have a high density.
Hypothesis 4: The structure will be highly centralised reflecting the bureaucratic structure of the QPF. This will be reflected in long average path lengths as communication follows the chain of command and the network will have a high rating of centrality.
Hypothesis 5: Social network analysis can identify key actors within the network that can be targeted to disrupt or close down the network's activity.
Methodology
The project followed three stages. First, data was extracted from police inquiries into corruption and the corrupt networks plotted as network maps. Then organised crime theory was used to examine the networks. Network analysis theories will be used to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the police networks to target strategies for detection, investigation and prevention.
Data for networks should include as much as possible of the data set, in this case the corrupt network. It is difficult to obtain information on criminal networks and most information available is unreliable. Data gathered from informers and incarcerated gang members cannot be checked because researchers cannot know the true size of the people involved. The nature of modern criminal enterprises means that membership and relationships are temporary and constantly in flux. For example, a core group of criminals may deal with different specialists for each job. These problems are reduced in an examination of police corruption such as this as the raw data utilised has been compiled through the comprehensive investigatory and coercive powers of formal Commissions of Inquiry. Corruption is a routine operation as opposed to the varied operation of a criminal network. Payments are made regularly by the same people to the same people. Natarajan notes that often researchers try to establish these factors through interviews with participants. Obviously, there is limited scope for this option and he has demonstrated that network analysis can reveal a great deal about these relationships without relying on interviews (Natarajan 2006 ). Thus there is much greater certainty when studying the network or more qualitative data on the nature of members of the network. In this project the data is pre-packaged in the inquiry reports.
There are limitations to this study. First, the data sources are imperfect and rely on evidence produced at police inquiries and reminiscences of participants. Neither source of data is complete. Moreover, the latter can be highly unreliable. However, these are the best sources available. Secondly, network maps may plot relationships that have been identified by a third party without the benefit of confirmation. Thus the appearance of a name on a map may imply an unconfirmed relationship In view of this, network maps should be read cautiously and only in connection with the accompanying commentary in which the details of relationships can be expanded. In this way, as Rogers (1987) contends network analysis can serve to 'turbo charge' case study information.
Given this article's specific focus on the Queensland policy corruption networks a content analysis of the Fitzgerald Inquiry (1989) report has been undertaken to distil three key variables of bribes, corrupt support which are central to police corruption: bribes, transference of bribes and corrupt support. The data used in the network maps in this article were specifically derived from Fitzgerald (1989) and Herbert and Gilling (2004) .
The relational data derived from the content analysis were collated and arrayed into matrices for each of the key variables identified above. From this starting point, network maps were constructed using UCINET6.
The resulting network maps were used to provide visual representations, of the nature and patterns of exchanges occurring within corrupt networks as well as the overall architecture/topology of the network. Associated network metric measures will provide additional and deeper insights into the structure and operation of the networks.
Analysis and Discussion: Uncovering Patterns, Structures and Roles of a Corrupt Police Network
The Corruption Network
No one knows when police corruption commenced in the Queensland Licensing Branch (QLB) within the Queensland Police Force (QPF). It is known however, that the corrupt network, or Joke, as it was known, was endemic by the 1950s. The corruption took the form of payments being made from bookmakers, prostitutes and operators of illegal gambling games to officers from the QLB in return for protection. The protection was reciprocal: payers would be warned of raids by non-corrupt officers and the payers would provide low level employees for token arrests for the payees so that they could record a satisfactory 'clean up rates' for vice in Queensland. If the New South Wales ' Wood Commission definitions are applied the corruption was both systemic, in so far as it was self-perpetuating within the QLB and entrenched, because the corrupt officers had alliances in place to defend their corrupt network from inquiries or interference (Wood 1977, para.2.4) . In network terms the Joke was an exclusive network that maintained a legitimate public face, concealing an invisible web of corrupt relationships. These relationships had developed to a strategic level to protect the inner web from external examination or attack. The data used to produce this map also generated a suite of network metrics that afford deeper insights into the structural properties of the network. The first metricdensity -provides an indication of the degree of cohesion evident. Table 1 that the Bribe sub network is loose in its structure and exhibits a low level of cohesion.
This means that this network is small, contained and loosely coupled involving those people immediately involved in the Bribe exchange. The Joke Payment, is comprised of both a slightly higher number of ties (12) The third set of ties, Corrupt Support, is the event that characterises most ties in the network (25) and displays the highest level of density at 0.0567 for this network.
Although this measure is low by normal standards, it is apparent that the corrupt network operates to provide a slightly denser web of connections that support and implicitly condone the illegal activities of the Bribe and Joke payment sub networks.
The overall low density measures for the Network Map (aggregate ties) highlights the low degree of connection between actors. A loosely coupled network is a necessary feature for a clandestine entity (UN 2002, 30) such as the corrupt police network which operates mostly under the radar, with players from different areas connecting the network (i.e. if it was too dense the corruption would be more recognisable). Another consequence of its confidential nature is the network's broken up or destructed format; one of the few central players is removed the network and information held between the others is disconnected.
However, this result conflicts with hypothesis 3 that a network based on the hierarchical QPF should have a high density reflecting the bureaucratic structure of the organisation. The higher density of the corrupt support network shows that there was greater reliance on the QPF structure to provide protection for the Licensing Branch; the layers of protection reflect the organisation structure as the protection is made possible by superior authority within the Force. Having said that, even this score is very low so we can conclude that while the actors' positions within the structure played a greater role in corrupt support, it is still outweighed by the need for a low profile to conceal the illicit activity.
The centrality of the network was 21.7% which is also quite low and indicates that the network is not controlled by one or two individuals. The players have multiple paths to connect with each other. This is clearly seen in figure one but there are still three players that dominate the map. Once again this is evidence that the QPF structure does not determine the structure of the network. Had the hierarchy been reflected then all paths would pass through Bischof the Police Commissioner; if he was the senior police officer everyone's' actions would reflect the chain of command and seek his approval to act on their own or communicate with other parts of the network. Control of a bottle neck of pathways is power (Burt 2005, 7) . As this is not the case then we can conclude that the network has more than one person in a position of power. As has been already stated, these belong to Bischof, Murphy and Herbert.
average path distance. That is, how easily it is for members to make contact or exchanges with others. In this case the average distance among reachable pairs = 1.000.
This means that amongst those people who are connected, on average they only need to travel one path/edge to reach another player they are not connected to. This finding is likely a feature of the relatively small size of the network. However, it does point to the fact that there is little distance between actors and therefore it is unlikely that those involved, even those on the peripheries were not aware of the activities. Figure 1 where it was noted that corrupt relations provide a foundation for the overall network. A more isolated and focused view of this tie reveals a point of fragility within the Joke. 
Identifying Key Actors
The following map demonstrates a further vulnerability of the network in the form of its key players. The map identifies the key actors by the size of the boxes for each player.
The three largest boxes are Frank Bischof, Tony Murphy and Jack Herbert. Potentially the removal of one or all of these from the network could disrupt or end the Joke.
Bischof was not present in the network for the duration of the period under review. Bischof was made Police Commissioner in 1958. He had been a member of the Joke for some years and used his position of authority to support its continuation (Fitzgerald 1989, p.31 The network also benefitted from a further layer of political alliances which could legitimately frustrate attempts to investigate or terminate the Joke. The primary player was the Queensland Police Union of Employees (QPUE). There is no evidence that the union executive were aware of corrupt activity but the QPUE always took the stance of defending members against allegations of corruption and consequently obfuscating the actions of those who tried to bring change to the Police Force (Fitzgerald 1989, p.35) . In the National Hotels Inquiry, the QPUE provided legal support to 88 officers who were named by investigators (Fitzgerald 1989, p.34) . Further support came from the Premier of Queensland, Johannes Bjelke-Petersen, who made a political alliance with the QPUE.
The Premier did his best to stop change occurring in the QPF in return for the public support of the QPUE and police officers for his hard-line law and order policies (Fitzgerald 1989, p.36) . Once again there is no evidence that Bjelke-Petersen had knowledge of, or received any payments from, the Joke.
Network Disruption
The "Joke' network was not indestructible and it only took 'a few good men' to bring it down. The first of these was Allen Hodges who upon becoming Minister of Police in immediate and long-lasting conflict with the QPUE and by association, the Premier. One of Whitrod's reforms was to set up the Crime Intelligence Unit (CIU) under Gulbransen with the power to investigate police and specific instructions to keep watch on the QLB (Fitzgerald 1989, p.38) . He also transferred Tony Murphy and Terry Lewis to country postings away from the action of the Joke (Fitzgerald 1989, p.43) .
These developments alone would not have been enough to close down the Joke.
The outer layer of support mobilised with the QPUE and the Premier openly opposing the new Commissioner. The QPUE, with Bjelke-Petersen's acquiescence, advised its members not to cooperate with CIU (Fitzgerald 1989, p.38) and actively opposing Whitrod's reforms and denied his allegations of corruption in the QLB (Fitzgerald 1989, p.36) . But the removal of Bauer, Murphy and Lewis meant that the corrupt support network was broken; the new police commissioner was not only a non-member of the Joke but actively opposed corruption, also both the relationship facilitator, Murphy, and his only possible replacement, Lewis, were geographically isolated from each other and the Joke. But the end of the Joke came when appointed Bill Osborne as head of the QLB.
Osborne had been a member of the Branch for 10 years and knew how the Joke worked, even if he was never a member. Osborne informed Herbert that the Joke had to stop. The members had to comply because Osborne's knowledge of the system meant they couldn't trick him and keep the Joke going (Herbert and Gilling 2004, p.74 ). Herbert and others transferred out of QLB in 1974 (Fitzgerald 1989, p.38 
) Herbert went to the Public
Relations Office and retired medically unfit 3 months later. The Joke couldn't continue without a senior officer involved (Herbert and Gilling 2004, pp.74-75) . Future research will discuss the return of corruption, known as the Second Joke, when the corrupt support network was re-established by the appointment of Lewis as Police Commissioner in Whitrod's stead, and the reappointment of Murphy to Brisbane.
Implications
The analysis conducted in this article makes it possible to reach clear conclusions about the nature of this particular police corruption network after testing the five hypotheses. The review has shown that the corrupt police network, while organised, nonetheless exhibits a different structural and functioning to conventional organisation and other criminal networks.
Hypothesis 1: the network will only extend to those who can be trusted through association with a common denominator, was supported. Membership of the three groups Hypothesis 2: A small number of individuals will broker arrangements between the illicit operators and the police, was not supported. While Herbert conducted the day to day operation of the Joke, individual officers independently brokered connections and took payments which they then passed to Herbert. Thus there was a low level of control over the operation of the network; a point which will be returned to under Hypothesis 4.
Hypothesis 3: the structure of the corruption network will mirror the hierarchy of the police force thus it will have a high density, was disproved. Other than the necessity of having the participation of the Police Commissioner, there is almost no mirroring of the police hierarchy in the structure of the Joke network.
Hypothesis 4: The structure will be highly centralised reflecting the pyramidal structure of the QPF. This will be reflected in long average path lengths as communication follows the network will have a high rating of centrality. Both average path lengths and centrality did not indicate the reliance on the chain of command in the operation of the network. There was no single authority over the network which was a diffuse group of individuals providing support on an ongoing basis based on ad hoc relationships. This network is unique for criminal networks as it exists within an organisation.
Whilst it is well recognised that organisations contain networks, the research on criminal networks is able to examine groups that by necessity exist independent of another noncriminal organisation (Morselli 2001 , 2003 , Morselli and Roy 2008 . The Joke was operated by members of a legitimate organisation, namely the Queensland Police
Force. This created considerations for its operation that did not exist for criminal groups.
A criminal enterprise needs members that can perform specific tasks, for example, a drug smuggling enterprise needs technical skills for preparing drugs, operating sea or air craft, and brokerage agents with connections for purchase and sale (Thompson 2008) . The members of the Joke needed brokers but they also needed to include and placate key people not because of the skills or their ability to broker bribes, but because of their position within the Queensland Police Force and their power to close down the corrupt network. These individuals were more than brokers; they extorted the operation by holding it for ransom. The prime example of this was Frank Bischof the Police Commissioner.
Another unique aspect to this group was the layers of protection provided by the network. The Licensing Branch provided corrupt support in the form of protection for the bribers, namely the operators of illegal gambling and prostitution. The senior police then provided corrupt support in the form of protection for the members of the Licensing Branch. The Premier and QPUE provided legitimate political support and protection as a by product, to the senior police.
There are three avenues for further research based on this project. The first is to determine further strengths and weaknesses of the networks via organisational theory and establish practical strategies for detection, investigation and prevention within the police service. A further step will be to map the Second Joke. This will be followed by network analysis of the corrupt networks investigated by the Wood Royal Commission in New South Wales (Wood 1997) 
